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Abstract 
 
The presentation of socially relevant events in the mass media can have a substantial impact 
on the public attribution of responsibility (Iyengar 1991). The mass media do not only monitor 
political processes, they also construct a political problem in a certain way that affects the 
citizens’ perception of who is to blame and who should be hold accountable.  
Further, the process of responsibility attribution, this is “who is responsible for what?” 
influences the image, the competences and the legitimacy of political authorities (Gerhards et 
al. 2007). Thus, by detecting reasons for the perception of a political problem, the media 
influences the political problem-solving process and the scope of problem solving strategies, 
which is crucial for the conditions of citizen's support. In other words, we consider the 
attribution of responsibility to be a pre-condition for framing effects (Entman 2004). 
The paper focuses on developing a content-analysis instrument according to Gerhards et al. 
(2007), in order to capture the elusive concept of the political public sphere. Based on a 
systematic analysis of different newspapers, we compare across countries (Israel, The 
United States, Germany and Switzerland) and across time (May 2010-September 2010) who 
is held responsible for the incident on the aid flotilla in May 2010 and who is asked to take 
action.  
The paper concludes that even though the media takes an essential part in constructing the 
public sphere, the process of responsibility attribution is driven by the political logic and not 
the one of the media. The growing intrusion of the media logic as an institutional rule that 
defines the appropriate behaviour of political actors must not be overestimated and depends 
to a certain extent on the institutional landscape. The prevailing state monopoly on relevant 
information and the lack of publicity of actors on the non-national level remains a stumbling 
block for the media as a fourth estate. 
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 Comparative international political communication 
The investigated issue is a new emerging discipline and has to be conducted by an 
interdisciplinary team of political and communication scientists. By its very nature, political 
communication is a product of the media and the political system, whereas one is in need of 
the other driven by its own logic. It remains utterly complex to track back the formation of 
political news in the process of political communication and to analyze the involvement of 
dominant actors and relevant processes. Since the rise of communication and media studies, 
a remarkable number of theories have been developed in respect to the interplay between 
media and politics (see Gurevitch & Blumler 1995, Esser & Pfetsch 2004). However, just a 
limited number of methodological instruments have been developed. The aim of this paper is 
to present an attempt of using an existing technique by Gerhards et al. (2007) in order to 
compare political communication across countries. Thus, to avoid the extensive analysis of 
the political communication process itself in an international scope, research in respect 
focuses on political news coverage. This perspective allows a broad international comparison 
of news content, as well as taking into account newspapers, media and political system 
characteristics (Hallin & Mancini 2004). Simultaneously it focuses on media and political 
actors, as a proxy in analyzing projections of power (Entman 2004).  
Public attention in political conflicts and crises gives substantial reason to consider the news 
media to be a central arena for the conflict itself or at any rate for the negotiation of guilt and 
responsibility and the social relevance of the conflict. Political conflicts can involve a broad 
spectrum of international actors which are portrayed in the media from different national 
perspectives. It is of high interest to what extent international comparative content-analysis 
allows showing different national patterns of media structures, actors and media 
perspectives.  
A building block of political communication is the public attribution of responsibility. The 
concept of responsibility itself has two advantages. On the one hand, responsibility is a social 
or moral concept, which can alter in respect to culture, context, actors and time. On the other 
hand, political responsibility is equal to formal accountability, and thus, at the heart of 
democratic legitimacy. In a globalized world it is essential for multi-national audiences to 
identify responsibilities within a complex international conflict and who is to blame or to 
endorse. From a normative point of view accountability of political actors to society through 
political communication is a core function of media to the quality of democracy (Gurevitch & 
Blumler 1990). However, who is publically hold accountable in an international conflict, such 
as the raid on the flotilla in May 2010, differs among nations and newspapers, but also 
among social groups and cultures.  
We assume that the control over the political news in such a conflict is a core interest of the 
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 relevant actors (or institutions) who are involved in the conflict. In contrast, the loss of control 
over political news can entail the danger of loosing political support of democratically elected 
actors in the national system, but also on the international level, such as the United Nations 
or the European Union.   
 
Political communication & framing responsibility 
Political rhetoric applied by the authorities to maintain stability, power and legitimacy is one 
of the oldest modus operandi in politics, deeply rooted in the execution of power. Evidently, 
being considered as legitimate was and still is an indispensable moral resource for popular 
political support. Today, the strategic use of public communication to form, frame and guide 
the perception of political conduct in public is reborn with the struggle for attention in the 
highly mediatised society. To date, a profound number of studies were written in order to 
understand how campaigning and control over the news agenda has an impact on winning 
elections, pushing policies and the success of people's initiatives (Entman 2004, Hänggli & 
Kriesi 2010). Moreover, we argue that the strategic use of political communication is part of 
the daily political business, salient during election times, but especially crucial in time of 
political conflict or crisis.  
In contemporary democracies the strategic use of news making is rather subtle and diffuse, 
than manipulative and propagandistic. On the one hand political actors face strong 
challenges from the media sector. The fight for public attention is a daily struggle inside 
mediatised democracies (c.f. Mazzoleni & Schulz 2001). Depending on the role of the state 
in the media system, a state's journalistic professionalism, the media market and political 
parallelism (Hallin & Mancini 2004), autonomy of the media sector differs profoundly among 
democracies and consequently its impact in the construction of political reality. On the other 
hand political institutions are still obtaining a somewhat informational monopoly over political 
news and invest notable funds into professional and political communication management 
(c.f. Vogel 2010).  
One political communication strategy is to stress particular aspects of public issues and to 
control this emphasis made upon these issues. Therefore, framing is to construct reality and 
to shape how the political environment is perceived in society. Frames are "central 
organizing ideas that provide coherence to a designated set of idea elements" (Ferree, 
Gamson, Gerhards, & Rucht, 2002: 105). Since citizens have only limited access to the 
political system and its informational environment, they must rely on news media and are to 
some degree involuntarily exposed to how political reality is constructed through frames. 
Whether a frame has an impact on the individual perception or not, depends "on their relative 
accessibility, that is, the ease with which they come to mind" (Iyengar 1990:21). 
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 Due to this exposure, frames construct a cognitive socio-political landscape, whereas the 
framed perspective ideally serves those who construct frames. On the one hand, the process 
of construction when going public can be a result of active frame construction by decisive 
actors. But on the other hand, in the multistep process of political communication, frames 
come into existence by "cascading network activation" (Entman 2004: 9). In other words 
cascading activation means the transaction of a specific perspective on an issue, whereas 
interests along involved political institutions, as well as the penetration with media logic, 
shape the form of the frame. Accordingly, the ability to promote frames is stratified because 
some actors have more power than others to push ideas along to the news and then to the 
public (Entman 2004: 9).  
The most democratically relevant news frame in politics is inevitably the attribution of 
responsibility. Responsibility in politics means accountability to society, required throughout 
the official occupation of a political position. Politicians have to care about societal problems 
because society authorized them to do so. Responsibility and causality of political problems 
are always a salient issue in the public sphere and are at all times a dominant issue in public 
communication (Gerhards et al. 2007: 105). For example; who is to be hold accountable in 
times of financial crisis, is it politics, entrepreneurs, banks or regulatory agencies? Or, who is 
to be hold accountable in international conflicts? Who caused the problem and who is 
responsible? The involvement of several horizontal and vertical state and non-state actors in 
conflict or crisis situations blurs the distinction between responsibility and accountability in 
public. But social responsibility as a core issue in the public refers to both, responsibility, 
because it is a collectively shared social concept and accountability, because attributing 
responsibility requires accounting for one's conduct. Thus, for the support of political actors 
and their actions it is crucial to whom causes, responsibilities and competencies are 
attributed. The more relevance such a public body has to society, the more important it is to 
influence one's own support and perception within the mediatised reality.  
The process of attributing responsibility predominantly takes place within the public sphere. 
According to Gerhards et al. (2007) political news are not only reported but expediently 
constructed and interpreted. Personal interpretation through political and media actors is an 
aligning process in the construction of frames. As a matter of fact, the frame building 
provokes two consequences: On the one hand, the attributions of causalities and 
responsibilities are connoted to contextual policies or incidents and determine to a certain 
degree how the problem is associated and approached by the responsible political actors. 
On the other hand, attributing responsibility and causalities has an effect on citizens, 
because evaluation and estimation of political actors are experienced indirectly, through the 
media because of the public's limited access to politics (Gerhards et al. 2007: 106). Citizens 
who read in the news about poor political performance attributed to a particular actor likely 
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 might rethink their support when going to the polls and call their representatives to account. 
Furthermore it is of outstanding relevance for international actors how they present 
themselves in crisis and conflict situations because this is when power is distributed1 in the 
presence of multi-national audiences.  
Iyengar argues similarly that societal perception of responsibility in terms of leadership and 
political processes can convey significant policy implications (Iyengar 1990: 36). Hence we 
argue that framing responsibility through political communication is a key variable in the 
construction of (latent) support and democratic accountability.2
Apart from their implications, frames refer to three different classes of objects: political 
events, issues and actors (Entman 2004: 24). Accordingly the success of a frame depends 
on the extent these three reporting classes concertize within the same frame of reference. In 
the given situation the military raid on the flotilla corresponds with the event, within the 
context of Middle East conflict (issue) and the multi-lateral involvement of Israel, Turkey, the 
US, the Palestinian Territories, and the UN and to some extent the European community 
(actors). However, the aim of this paper is not analyzing the success of a specific frame, but 
to analyze and compare the construction of an event-frame in different newspapers from the 
advent of the event to the dissolution of its press coverage.    
From a theoretical perspective a frame has to pass four steps in order to become a fully 
developed narrative. These steps, respectively functions, are: (a) defining problematic 
effects/ conditions, (b) identifying cause/ agent, (c) endorsing remedy, and finally, (d) 
conveying moral judgment (ibid. p. 24). Taking into account the nature of an event like the 
raid on the flotilla, defining the problem (a) is already given. At this point it offers to combine 
with Gerhards' responsibility attribution for content analysis which, to large extents, covers 
frame functions (b), (c) and (d). Thus, applying the attribution of responsibility to Entman's 
framing theory perfectly fits for our content analysis. Hence, according to Gerhards', an actor 
attributes a cause to another actor (b), and by doing this judges the attribution negatively 
(blame, failure) or positively (success) (d). In contrast to attributing causes for success or 
failure, actors attribute responsibility for problem solutions to actors (c) whom they consider 
competent. For instance in the context of the given flotilla incident: Turkey accuses (d) the 
Israeli military (b) of inadequate reaction to the behaviour of the activist on the boat (a) and 
calls Israel (b) for an apology (c). An attribution is, therefore, only complete, if the triad of 
attribution sender, addressee and subject is fully given within the semantic structures of the 
article (Gerhards' et al. 2007: 110f).  
                                                 
1 C.f. Entman 2007 
2 C.f. Meyer 1999 
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attribution sender attribution adressee attribution subject
Attribution triad: Gerhards et al. 2007: 111
 
 
 
 
Coding triadic constellations allows taking into account different actors as senders and 
addresses across countries, including journalists who speak for themselves. Hence, 
communication through the media in respect to public responsibility is especially important, 
because communication can be carried out between actors of different horizontal and vertical 
levels. 
However, according to Gerhards, attention within the scientific community to this crucial 
social phenomenon has been very poorly approached and is theoretically, methodologically 
and empirically underdeveloped (Gerhards et al. 2007: 106). Thus, after all, we consider 
Gerhard's "attributing responsibility" as an appropriate instrument for comparing political 
communication but also as a contribution to the current discussion on framing and it's 
potential for analyzing "projections of power" Entman (2004). 
 
Methodology  
In order to gain an accurate sample of news press coverage, we chose two national 
newspapers for each country (Switzerland: Tages Anzeiger, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 
Germany: Die Tageszeitung, Berliner Morgenpost, USA: Washington Post, New York Times 
and from Israel: Haaretz, Jerusalem Post, English versions). Each of these newspapers 
enjoys considerable influence in the country of respect. Further we tried to pay attention to 
an equally distributed liberal and conservative spectrum of the newspapers' political 
orientation.  
The flotilla event is dated on the 31st of May 2010, when the raid by the Israeli military took 
place on one of the six ships. The aid flotilla for the Gaza strip was organized by the Free 
Gaza Movement and the Turkish Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and 
Humanitarian Relief (İHH) and carried activists from across the world. We identified all 
relevant articles by their headlines (through keywords and temporal limitation) from May 31 
until some days after the UN report was published on September 24 in 2010. 
25 articles per newspapers were coded along a previously constructed codebook. 
Developing a codebook for a framing-analysis is a rather qualitative process, whereas its 
analysis is purely quantitatively. The codebook is generated by pre-testing a random 
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 collection of the news article sample. This allows coding the event as such in its context, as 
well as the associated subjects, all relevant actors and some formal criteria of the 
newspapers. Once the codebook is completed, it cannot be altered any longer. Even thought 
there might be additional emerging issues during coding, these cannot be taken into account 
in the present analysis.  
Finally, the single units of the dataset consist of one full attribution with regards to Gerhards' 
et al. framing technique (c.f. Gerhards' et al 2007: 110). An attribution is only considered to 
be complete when it includes the triad of the attribution sender, addressee and attribution 
subject (e.g. "the behaviour of the activist on the flotilla") within the scheme of responsibility. 
Depending on the language in respect, the semantic scheme can be visible in a single 
sentence but also, the attribution elements can be distributed over half of the article. Further, 
Gerhards et al. distinguish between causal attribution of success (positive) or failure 
(negative) and attributing responsibility for problem solutions, whereas both can be rejected 
or assigned by the ones to whom responsibility is ascribed to. Having coded actors as 
attribution senders and addresses, as well as the subjects of responsibility, coding the 
attribution character (see scheme below) completes one unit of analysis.   
 
 Attribution statement
Causal attribution Responsibility attribution
Assignment Rejection Assignment Rejection 
positive 
negative
ambivalent ambivalent
positive
Code scheme based on Gerhards et al. 2007: 116.
negative 
Who caused the probelm? Who is asked to take actions? 
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 Results 
 
Structural features of responsibility attribution 
One of the main concerns by Gerhards et al. (2007) in applying their coding scheme is the 
low density of attribution (attributions per article). In their analysis they scored a density value 
of 1.41. In our study, 
however, we achieved 
a density of 3.15. This 
difference is probably 
due to the fact that we 
analyzed a specific 
event and not the public 
role of an actor in 
general as Gerhards et 
al. did in his study of 
the European Union. Furthermore, the analyzed event can be 
categorized as a crisis where the search for the causes of political failures starts immediately 
and established authorities are questioned. In such a context the public discourse depicted in 
the media relies on responsibility attributions which imply a high density of attributions per 
article. 
Attributions 
Causal Competence Total 
76.5% 23.5%  
N=481 N=148  
positive negative ambivalent positive negative ambivalent  
20.2% 72.7% 7.1% 83.8% 12.8% 3.4%  
       
N=102 N=345 N=34 N=124 N=19 N=5 N=629 
Table 1: All newspapers
From a structural point of view, the content analysis has two major findings. First, there is an 
overall pattern of the ratio between causal attributions and competence attributions: three 
quarters of all attributions are causal statements and one quarter refers to the attribution of 
competence (see table 1). This holds true for all newspaper, as well as for each country. The 
results show also a consistent pattern of the characteristics of the attributions: 75% of the 
causal attributions are negative. In the majority of the attributions someone is blamed for a 
failure. If competence attributions are considered, there are approximately 80% positive 
statements if all data sources are evaluated as well as at the national level. The data 
analysis indicates that ambivalent statements neither the causal nor to the competence 
related ones, are of substantial relevance. These findings are congruent to the results of 
Gerhards et al. (2007). The “communicative attack” dominates the public debate. However, 
we found a much stronger score on the competence attribution variable. Gerhards et al. 
detect only in 6.8% statements a competence attribution (p.119). This is probably due to the 
discourse logic in a crisis context as discussed above. 
Second, self-attributions are less frequent than attributions by another actor. Only in 10 out of 
100 cases an actor attributes success or failure to himself. In the remaining cases, a success 
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 or a failure is attributed to someone else. Surprisingly, negative self-attributions (31.8%) are 
almost as frequent as the positive (43.9%) ones. The hypotheses of Gerhards et al. (2009) 
that actors attribute successes to them and simultaneously pursue the strategy of blame-
shifting can not be confirmed that unambiguously as by the data of Gerhards et al. (2009). 
From a point of view of a communication strategist acknowledge a mistake can increase the 
public reputation of an actor. Those who recognize and admit mistakes and learn from them 
are perceived as strong and responsible actors and also it minimizes the risk of being 
blamed by others. 
 
Attribution between actors 
The actor constellation (see table 2) 
corresponds largely to the results of 
Gehrhards et al. (2009).  
The political actors are the one that are 
sender and addressees in the first place. 
This becomes even more evident if all 
aggregated groups that are linked to the 
political system are considered: “politics”, 
“military” and “international level”. They 
have a total share of more than 70%. 
This is a substantial evidence for a 
monopoly on relevant information of the 
political actors that enables them to 
substantially shape the public discourse. In terms of Hallin/Mancini 
(2004) this supports the hypothesis of political parallelism3.   
Aggregated actor groups 
 Sender Addressee 
Politics 46.2% 57.3%  
Military 9.1%  12.3%  
Media 14.4%  2.6% 
Experts 5.8%   0%  
Civil society 5.4%  5.3%  
International level 14.4%  9.7%  
Others 4.7%  12.8%  
 N=606 N=606 
Tabel 2: All newspapers
As “Israel” is the main sender and addressee in the national media coverage under scrutiny, 
it is fruitful to discuss this actor in detail. 
 
Israel in the public discourse: a comparative perspective 
To compare the different news coverage across the countries under scrutiny, it is sensible to 
distinguish between the country that was directly exposed to the event and the other 
countries that have an observer perspective. Of course, one must be aware of the different 
relations of the US, Switzerland and Germany with Israel when drawing conclusions from the 
                                                 
3 Political parallelism is one among four characteristics used by Halling & Mancini to compare media systems. 
Political parallelism refers to independent journalism and its significant autonomy opposite the political system 
(see 2004: 217f.). It is closely linked to the concept of journalistic professionalism.  
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 empirical results. 
First we will discuss the news coverage in Israel. In approximately one quarter of all 
attributions, Israel acts as a sender and about 80% of these statements are positive self-
attributions. In 30% of the cases, Israel uses the strategy of blame-shifting: negative 
attributions are made in equal parts to the participants of the 
flotilla and to the UN. In around 40 out of 100 cases, Israel is 
an addressee of an attribution. In 17% Israel depicts itself, 
mostly positive. To the same part, Israel is blamed for the 
incident by Turkey (17%), the UN (13%) and the US (9%) as 
well as the media (9%). Second, the news coverage in the 
observer countries is under scrutiny. In the US, again around 
40 out of 100 cases are attributions with Israel as a Sender, 
but not the positive self-attributions are predominant, rather 
Israel is presented as blaming itself for the raid on the flotilla.  
Furthermore, Israel is asked to take actions. In the US 
newspaper, the Israeli military is a key player. Israel blames 
the military for the incidents on the flotilla and demands an 
active role of the military in the investigation process. The 
attributions with Israel as an addressee consist of 
approximately 40% responsibility attributions to Israel. In addition to the 
self-attributions mentioned above, the Israeli military and the US 
address Israel in the newspapers: the military in a negative way and the US in a majority of 
the cases in ambivalent way with a slightly positive tendency. The same applies for causal 
and responsibility attributions. The international level, however, almost unanimously blames 
Israel for its actions.  
Top 3  
Sender % 
Israel 21.8 
Media 11.9 
Turkey 8.3 
Addressee % 
Israel 39.5 
Military 12.8 
Activists 5.4 
Subject % 
Raid on flotilla 23.3 
Middle East conflict 11.6 
Investigation 13.1 
Tabel 3: All newspapers
In the German newspapers, only 17% of all attributions are made by Israel, therefore the 
significance is limited. There is no polarization in the public debate; the blame is almost 
equally shared amongst the relevant actors if the attributions made by Israel are considered. 
Besides the fact that there are only a small number of attributions at all, the Israeli military is 
approximately equally present in the media as the government of Israel. The Israeli 
government does not get as much space in the media as in the other countries. In a third of 
the attributions Israel is the addressee, as in the sender-scenario, there is a balanced 
attribution-pattern with no polarization. 
Finally, Switzerland is scrutinized. As in Germany, only 17% of all attributions are made by 
Israel and the majority are positive self-attributions. Israel also attributes the UN a positive 
role in the incident. In the Swiss newspapers, Israel blames the activists for the flotilla 
incident in 16% of the attributions the Israeli governments makes. The media has the most 
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 dominant role if attributions to Israel are considered: a quarter of the attributions are sent by 
the media and more than 90% are of a negative character. The second important sender in 
the public discourse is Turkey (19%): two thirds of the attributions are negative, but at the 
same time, Turkey asks Israel to take an active role in the investigation process.     
 
Comparison over time: Issue or event? 
Besides patterns of responsibility attribution, the content analysis according to Gerhards et 
al. (2007) provides valuable insights on the level of conflict in the public discourse. The 
coded subjects allow making a distinction between issues and events4. The “issues” refer to 
the news coverage of the Middle East conflict in general and the “events” to the specific 
incident on May 31st, 2010.   
All Newspapers
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
Mai 10 Jun 10 Jul 10 Aug 10 Sep 10
Event Issue Other  
The relevance of this differentiation is twofold. On the one hand, it can be used as an 
indicator of the quality of journalism in a country. The higher the percentage of subjects that 
are categorized as issues, the higher the quality of journalism, because the discussion of the 
Middle East conflict in general implies more background information and more opinion-
forming news coverage. By contrast a higher percentage of “events” indicates that the 
                                                 
4 Subjects coded as „Event“: Raid on flotilla, action of the Israeli Military, action of the activists on the flotilla, action of the Israeli 
government, investigation of the incident, political orientation of the activists. 
Subjects codes as “Issue”: Sea blockade, Middle East conflict, terrorism, anti-Semitism,  
Subjects coded as “Others”: Passivity, None. 
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 incident is not discussed in a broader context and one can assume that the journalists mostly 
rely on agency reports and that investigative journalism is lower than in the news coverage 
with a high proportion of “issues”. On the other hand, the ratio of “events” and “issues” shows 
if the intended purpose of the activists – to increase public attention for the situation in Gaza 
– was achieved. Hence, the PR action should  
show a lasting effect in the news coverage. The diagram for all newspapers highlights that 
there was only a short-time effect of the incident on May 31st. In June 2010, the media 
actually makes the Middle East issue a subject of 
discussion compared to the month before the incident 
ant the ones afterwards. Furthermore, approximately 
one quarter of the attributions refer to the issue (See 
table 4). But the effect is not at all long lasting.  
Frames Amount % 
Event 434 77% 
Issue 120 21.3% 
 
Total of attributions:564 
In a comparative perspective, there are no major 
differences among countries. Switzerland is the only case where the 
“Middle East conflict” subject is more often than any coded “event” subject. In the US and in 
Israel, the media emphasizes the importance of the investigation of the incident. 
Table 4: All newspapers 
 
Conclusion 
The content analysis according to Gerhards et al. (2007) offers a convincing tool to depict the 
politically relevant aspects of the public discourse. Even more, the gathered attributions of 
responsibility are suitable for a proxy of the projection of power in the sense of Entmann 
(2004). Attributing responsibility, in a positive or negative way, is fundamental in a 
representative political system and the media play an important role as a transmitter. Aware 
of this fact, political actors have an incentive to control the portrayal of political issues in the 
media. Therefore, we assumed that actors try to capture as much of the public sphere as 
possible to present themselves in a favourable position. The event of the aid flotilla confirms 
this strategy of political actors. Approximately 75% of all attributions are of a negative 
character. Thus, our findings show as well the dominant pattern of the “communicative 
attack” as detected by Gerhards et al. 
Governments and institutions close to the government are the main senders and addressees 
in the content analysis performed in this study. The civil society and, especially the flotilla 
activists who planned a PR activity, have no voice in the public discourse. Furthermore, they 
did not succeed in bringing the situation in Gaza on the public agenda. The media effect of 
the incident was not at all long lasting. They did not only fail in presenting their issues directly 
in the media as a sender, but they also failed in bringing up the topic via other actors. 
Therefore, the event also confirms that the public discourse is a valuable proxy for the 
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 projection of power: it shows the strength of the state actors as well as the weakness of the 
societal actors to present their issues in the media. Further, the role of the media as a forth 
estate should be questioned. Our results did not portray the media as an actor on its own 
perspective. 
Our results show two explanatory factors for the structural power in the mediatised public 
sphere. Structural access in terms of visibility in the news and structural access in terms of 
control over the news content are the most decisive factors in projecting power through the 
news media. Hence, it is not sufficient to be in the media but how to be portrayed in the 
media in order to legitimize oneself or to delegitimize antagonists.  Additionally, it confirms 
some of Wolfsfeld's thoughts on the dependence on the news media (1999: 22).  Addressing 
structural access to news in respect to power can be best explained by cumulative inequality, 
meaning that those who are most in need of the news media are those who find it the most 
difficult to obtain them (Wolfsfeld 1999: 24). Referring to the war in Bosnia, Wolfsfeld points 
out that only after remarkable journalists' effort the NATO issued an ultimatum to the Serbs to 
end their blockade of Sarajevo of 1994 after their bloody attack (1999:23). With respect to 
the Middle East conflict, the situation is somewhat similar. The access of the minority group 
to the relevant news media is impeded by the power over the news by the majority group. 
Hence, the majority group is structurally empowered to control the news media caused by 
the dynamics of cumulative inequality. The intention of the activists to frame the flotilla 
incident can be interpreted as a try to break this very dynamic. 
However, what remains visible in the media, therefore, is very likely to be a mirror of how 
refeudalized5 the public sphere is, unless the media tries to represent and integrate all 
relevant aspects of the issue in respect. But the current study shows that the news media to 
large extents publishes elite's perspectives and only very few offers voice to less powerful 
actors in a given situation. It is stunning to what extent the media ignores Palestinian or 
activists voices in important western newspapers but also the weakness of the media to 
integrate the incident into the Middle East conflict. Unfortunately, we did not cover any 
English Palestinian newspaper, Turkish or other Arab English news. It goes without saying 
that this was considered in the interpretation of our results. 
With regards to the framing theory, the incident under scrutiny only contributes to event 
framing. The frequency of who attributes (positively or negatively) what to whom through the 
news media, provides profound insights into the characteristics of the event frame. But to 
analyze to what extent this event frame conforms to the overall habitual scheme (issue, 
event and political actors, Entman 2004: 24) of the Middle East conflict requires further 
operationalizations for issue and actor frames. Nevertheless it is of high interest how the 
                                                 
5 Habermas (1989) uses this term to express the structural power within the public sphere. 
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 schemata of the Middle East conflict contain an overarching paradigm (ibid. 24). 
From a methodological point of view, this procedure involves several challenges. Gerhards et 
al. (2007) mention the problem of the intercoder-reliability (Gerhards et al. 2007: 117) and 
the low density of attributions in the media. These difficulties arise from the sophisticated 
code book that is, however, essential to cover the attributed responsibilities. We proceeded 
in an explorative way that allowed us to modify Gerhards et al.’s approach. We reduced 
some of his categories and performed the content analysis in the context of a particular event 
instead of a general time period. The analysis of a crisis event increases the density of 
attribution and makes the latent structure of power more evident and eases therefore the 
data collection of responsibility attributions. Consequently, one has only a snapshot and to 
draw general conclusions about the allocation of power, further investigation over time and 
space is required. However, the approach suggested by Gerhards et al. is a promising tool 
for national and international comparison of political communication strategies and the 
distribution of power in the public sphere. 
 
 
 
 
14 
 Literature 
Blumler, Jay G.; Gurevitch, Michael (1995): The crisis of public communication. London: 
Routledge (Communication and society). 
 
Entman, Robert M. (2004): Projections of power. Framing news, public opinion, and U.S. 
foreign policy. 3. pr. Chicago, Ill.: The Univ. of Chicago Press (Studies in communication, 
media, and public opinion). 
 
Entman, Robert M. (2007): Framing Bias: Media and the distribution of power. In: Journal of 
Communication, Jg. 57, H. 1, p. 163–173. 
 
Esser, Frank; Pfetsch, Barbara (2004): Comparing political communication. Theories, cases, 
and challenges. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press (Communication, society, and politics). 
 
Ferree, Myra Marx; Gerhards, Jürgen; Gamson, William; Rucht, Dieter (2002): Shaping 
abortion discourse. Democracy and the public sphere in Germany and the United States. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Communication, society, and politics). 
 
Gerhards, Jürgen; Offerhaus, Anke; Roose, Jochen (2009): Wer ist verantwortlich? Die 
Europäische Union, ihre Nationalstaaten und die massenmediale Attribution vor 
Verantwortung für Erfolge und Misserfolge, S. 529–558. 
 
Gerhards, Jürgen; Offerhaus, Anke; Roose, Jochen (2007): Die öffentliche Zuschreibung von 
Verantwortung. In: Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Jg. 59, H. 1, p. 
105–124. 
 
Gerhards, Jürgen; Roose, Jochen; Offerhaus, Anke (2004): Die Europäische Union und die 
massenmediale Attribution von Verantwortung. Eine länder-, zeit- und medienvergleichende 
Untersuchung. 
 
Gurevitch, Michael; Blumler, Jay G. (1990): Political communication systems and democratic 
values. In: Lichtenberg Judith (Hg.): Democracy and the Mass Media. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, p. 269–289. 
 
Hallin, Daniel C.; Mancini, Paolo (2009): Comparing media systems. Three models of media 
and politics. 7th pr. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press (Communication, society, and 
politics). 
15 
 Iyengar, Shanto (1990): Framing Responsibility für political issues: the case of poverty. In: 
Political Behaviour, Jg. 12, H. 1, p. 19–40. 
 
Hänggli, Regula; Kriesi, Hanspeter (2010): Political Framing Strategies and Their Impact on 
Media raming in a Swiss Direct-Democratic Campaign. In: Political Communication, Jg. 27, 
p. 141–157. 
 
Maia, Rousiley Celi Moreira (2009): Media Visibility and the Scope for Accountabiltiy. In: 
Critical Studies in Media Communication, Jg. 26, H. 4, p. 372–392. 
 
Mazzoleni, Gianpietro; Schulz, Winfried (1999): "Mediatization" of Politics: A Challenge for 
Democracy? In: Political Communication, Jg. 16, H. 3, p. 247–261. 
 
Meyer, Christoph (1999): Political Legitimacy and the Invisibility of Politics: Exploring the 
European Union's Communication Deficit. In: Journal of Common Market Studies, Jg. 37, H. 
4, p. 617–939. 
 
Vogel, Martina (2010): Regierungskommunikation im 21. Jahrhundert. Ein Vergleich 
zwischen Großbritannien, Deutschland und der Schweiz. Univ., Diss.-Zürich, 2009. 1. Aufl. 
Baden-Baden: Nomos. 
 
Wolfsfeld, Gadi; Avraham, Eli; Aburaiya, Issam (2000): When prophesy always fails: Israeli 
Press Coverage of the Arab Minority's Land Day Protests. In: Political Communication, Jg. 
17, H. 115-131. 
 
Wolfsfeld, Gadi (1999): Media and political conflict. News from the Middle East. Reprinted. 
Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. 
 
 
 
 
16 
